Leadership by a 'big-man'has been observed as a successful governance structure in several historical contexts with small groups. We illustrate this by way of examples and analyse this framework in the context of non-cooperative games with narrowly sel…sh players. We show how norms solve the distributional con ‡ict inside a group and yield e¢ cient coordination of collective action in a con ‡ict with an external competitor. In the equilibrium one of the players assumes a central role that resembles the role of the 'big-man' in the empirical examples. Also, the group members' contributions to collective output and the donations from the big-man to these members seemingly look like reciprocal behavior, even though they are driven by narrowly sel…sh preferences in a fully non-cooperative equilibrium of a …nite game.
Introduction
Organizations such as business companies, clans or rudimentary states have to overcome two di¢ cult collective goods problems. First, they have to induce their members to contribute to group speci…c public goods or group income. Depending on the type of organization, these can be contributions to defence, e¤ort in acquiring the property of other groups, or productive e¤ort that increases group output. Second, the group members need to be prevented from …ghting internally when it comes to dividing the returns from the collective e¤ort among themselves. In a perfect world, these problems can easily be overcome by suitable contracts that are perfectly and costlessly enforced. However, in an imperfect world such enforcement is often unavailable. The ultimate enforcement power is clearly absent in clans or primitive states. Modern business organizations can rely on courts, but it is often very di¢ cult to write enforceable contracts which make their members contribute e¢ ciently to the group output and prevent members from internal …ghting in the allocation of output among group members.
We show that a fully e¢ cient outcome for both collective goods problems can emerge in a non-cooperative (subgame perfect) equilibrium of a game with complete information in the absence of any enforcement power. In this solution, the two collective goods problems interact. The underlying mechanism exploits the presence of multiple equilibria with respect to intragroup behavior, and equilibrium selection: if individuals do their duty in the collective good provision, then one of the players makes uncontingent donations to each group member. While we do not assume that this player is in control of any enforcement technology, this player has a particular role: he controls a su¢ cient amount of wealth to be able to make considerable redistributions. Also he will typically be among the most able …ghters in case of intra-group …ghting. If players' contributions and the 'big-man's' donations are in accordance with the group members'expectations or what could be called the group's "norms", then all group members choose the peaceful equilibrium. 1 If single members'contributions to group output di¤er 1 Our theory and in particular use of the term "norm" follows Hardin's in ‡uential view, that "an important fact about many norms is that behaviors they guide may be strongly reinforced by incentives of self-interest" (Hardin, 1995, p.22) , which makes norms the subject of consequentialist analysis. This view is in stark contrast to e.g. Elster, who claims that norms are not oucome-oriented (Elster, 1989 ). In our non-cooperative game set-up behavior according to a norm gets reinforced by individual self-interest, while at the same from these expectations, this upsets the other members. Donations will not be distributed and a less peaceful regime is chosen. Similarly, if all group members make adequate contributions to group output, but the big man's donations fall short of their expectations, they will also coordinate on the less peaceful regime. Resources will be wasted in these cases, and this is collectively disadvantageous. In turn, anticipation of this less peaceful regime as an outcome of neglecting own duties or inadequate donations may give the group members an incentive to behave in accordance with the expectations that lead to the peaceful regime. The fear of possible …ghting and resource wasting con ‡ict inside the group can stabilize an e¢ cient outcome in which group members voluntarily contribute to group speci…c public goods.
These elements of e¢ cient non-cooperative governance can be found in primitive societies who lack advanced technologies of coercion or enforcement technologies. They can also be found in modern organizations if e¢ cient contributions to team production are not veri…able and internal distributional con ‡ict cannot be ruled out. We outline three examples.
First, anthropologists like Sahlins (1963) describe the leadership regime of big-man for a variety of primitive states. Sahlins emphasizes the role of great public giveaways as a common means for a rising 'big-man'for a large number of societies, and for a number of Melanesian tribes in particular. Our game features a prominent …gure who has formal control of substantial resources in the absence of internal …ghting, and whose donations essentially replace an intra-group distribution mechanism for the group output. The 'big-man' represents this …gure well. The 'big-man' is involved in extensive and unconditional gift giving, whereas his 'followers'provide productive services. Orenstein et al. (1980, 71) emphasizes the importance of material wealth as a key quali…cation for leadership in this society: "Leadership was determined by wealth." Moreover, the transfer from the 'big-man'to his followers in these societies is seen as fully unconditional:
In this kind of ideology the leader is thought to give by right and receive by grace. The ordinary people, having elevated one of their members to the superordinate place, hold him in their debt time it is in the self-interest of any individual to have a (group) norm. Hardin's further, more concrete observation that "many norms appear to have the strategic structure of coordination" (Hardin, 1995, p.73 ) also pertains to our model: the power of a group is greatly enhanced by the e¢ cient coordination of individual e¤orts; which is achieved through the role of a clan leader, who also has (an incentive) to submit to the norm.
for this honor and require him to supply their expressed needs. What the leader gives to his constituency is their due; what he gets from them -largely the honor of high o¢ ce -is by their grace. (Orenstein et al., 1980, 71) This mutual giving has often been interpreted as reciprocating behavior (Sahlins, 1963, 293) . It is one of the major insights which can be gained from our analysis that mutual unconditional exchange need not be interpreted as reciprocity. Our non-cooperative approach reveals that what looks like mutual exchange or reciprocity from the outside may be a sequence of actions in a subgame perfect equilibrium among narrowly sel…sh players.
The e¢ cient provision of group e¤ort and the peaceful distribution of group output is only one possible equilibrium outcome in our framework. A group norm about adequate contributions to group output and adequate wealth distributions plays the role of coordination devices that allow players to choose this e¢ cient equilibrium. However, such a framework with multiple equilibria is notoriously prone to disturbances. It is therefore not surprising and in line with our results that Sahlins (1963, 293 ) also reports that "... there are not merely instances of big-man chicanery and of material deprivation of the faction in the interests of renown, but some also of overloading of social relations with followers: the generation of antagonism, defections, and in extreme cases the violent liquidation of the center-man." Similarly, Orenstein et al. (1980, 72) , referring to several other sources, reports: "Revolutions," usually bloodless, are frequent, for the people stand to gain from the installation of a new headman -that is, from the new man's as yet unconstrained resources.
Our second example considers an organization which established itself in a period in which more re…ned institutions of coercion and enforcement existed, but to which this organization could not resort to: the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Its long-time leader Yasir Arafat was known for travelling with a little suitcase which contained the information on access codes to a large set of funds of the PLO (see, e.g., Rubinstein 1995). Livingstone and Halevy (1990) describe these …nancial aspects in greater detail. They report that the Chairman's Secret Fund (CSF) was estimated to be in the range of two billion US-dollars, and used for funding the PLO's operations and Arafat's own struggle inside the PLO. They consider the CSF as the main source of Arafat's leadership:
Money is the source of Yasir Arafat's power. Without it Arafat would have been just another voice in the tumult, another salesman of broken dreams, a kind of Palestinian Willi Loman. Instead, he is a global mover and shaker, feted by kings and prime ministers, the leader of a revolution that threatens to change the map of the world. He is feared by his enemies, who know that his threats are not hollow, and loved by his followers, who know that he can be a generous patron. (pp. 184-185) His leadership regime resembled the big-man regime in a number of respects. Livingstone and Halevy (1990) report that Arafat used the CSF and expended large sums to fund weddings, wedding anniversaries and ceremonies for high ranking members inside the PLO. Also, he funded the operations, including the terrorist operations of group members of the PLO. These operations were the PLO's members'contributions to the group output or group income, as these operations created the type of credible threats that were required to elicit the payments of protection money from airline companies, oil companies and governments which, according to Livingstone and Halevy (1990) , replenished the PLO's bank accounts and the CSF.
A third example comes from the …nancial sector, well inside the 'o¢ cial sector'of modern economy: investment banking. Knee (2007) recognizes the importance of the collective goods problem, the di¢ culties in installing merit based compensation, and the potential for internal con ‡ict about the distribution of pro…t inside Morgan Stanley. 2 William D. Cohan (2007, p. 182n.) described the governance structure of Lazard when this investment banking company was de facto chaired by Michel David-Weill. The US branch of Lazard was a company with a large number of partners, and all partners contributed to the aggregate pro…t of the company. They received percentage shares in this aggregate pro…t. These shares, however, were freely chosen by Michel David-Weill, with himself as the residual claimant. Accordingly, Michel David-Weill was the de-facto owner of the …rm's pro…ts to which all partners contributed during the year, and he decided how much to give to each partner. As Cohan (2007, 184) describes it: 3 2 As Knee (2007, p. 120) explains: "The politics of which fees appear on which banker's "revenue sheet" in a given year and how this translates into actual compensation is more an art than science, and highly contested. Because any other alternative would have resulted in …st…ghts between bankers in the hallways, there was not even a theoretical limit to how many bankers could claim credit for the same deal."
3 This is not to say that the mechanism which we describe in this paper is the only Michel was generally happy to reward his partners well, often better than they could possibly be paid by other …rms. He was long-term greedy and knew that if the pie kept getting bigger, he stood to make more money himself, as he had the largest pro…t percentage by far. Mostly, though, Michel was interested in his partners'ability to generate fees -as he himself had little ability or desire to do so.
The governance structure which can be found in these examples and which we are going to describe more formally has several attractive features. Firstly, a …rst-best e¢ cient outcome for the collective goods problem is implemented in a purely non-cooperative framework. Secondly, all members of the group receive some -not necessarily the same-share in the group's income. This share can be seen as a compensation for the member's contribution to collective action, but is not part of a formal contract and is paid in a way that does not involve any promise or commitment by the recipient. Thirdly, group size is meaningful. Larger groups are more e¤ective in generating group income. Increasing returns in group size emerges endogenously from the assumption that each individual player's cost of group e¤ort is convex in own e¤ort. Fourthly, despite these increasing returns, there is an optimal group size that maximizes the group members' returns per capita. Finally, the framework o¤ers an explanation for why some organizations, clans, groups, or primitive states perform very well whereas others perform very badly. The analysis provides an example of the functioning, importance and implicit enforcement of norms: the implementation of the e¢ cient collective action requires all players to have a common view about their appropriate contribution to the collective good and about what would be an appropriate or equitable distribution of rents. Compliance with this norm is reinforced by self-interest. Deviation from this norms by a single player would induce a shift from one equilibrium to another, less attractive one. Hence the alignment of the norm with individual self-interest works twofold: self-interest is instrumental in stabilizing the norm, and the norm is instrumental in asserting self-interest. instrument of governance in Lazard at that time. David-Weill negotiated with partners, they lobbied him somwhat, and repetition may also have played a role. However, the key role of one player who is formally in charge of making uncontingent payments to the group members is noticeable.
Related literature
The question we address is most closely related to one of the most fundamental questions in the theory of the state: the enforcement of property rights. Seminal papers by Skaperdas (1992) , Hirshleifer (1988 Hirshleifer ( , 1995 and Grossman (1994) have stimulated a major research program. 4 Their starting point is the absence of property rights: players need to allocate their resources between production of consumable output and appropriation e¤ort, which may consist of stealing, arming or guarding. A general message that emerges from this literature is: the absence of property rights induces multiple inef…ciencies, because players use some of their resources trying to protect their income or wealth, or to steal from others, instead of using it for producing more consumer goods, and the fact that own production of consumer goods needs to be guarded and can be stolen further reduces the incentives to engage in productive activities. Contracts and the enforcement of contracts by courts would be desirable in such situations, but in numerous contexts contract enforcement is simply not feasible. This is true not only for early primitive societies, but also the most modern world, as has been highlighted by the study of incomplete contracts.
Researchers who study economics under anarchy are interested in how anarchy can be overcome, how existing rules of enforcement came into place, and about the welfare implications of such regimes. Olson (1993) and McGuire and Olson (1996) analyzed the welfare outcome if a king or sovereign ruler has access to a power monopoly and can enforce property rights. A power monopoly may improve upon the situation with anarchy, provided that the ruler can commit himself to abstain from ex-post opportunistic behavior. Long-term considerations and the forces of in…nitely repeated play may, but need not overcome what several writers identi…ed as the fundamental problem with an agent who has the power to enforce property rights: his ability to abuse this very power and to extort his subjects even more severely than in a state of anarchy. 5 Moreover, a competition for the position of enforcer of property rights may become an additional source of ine¢ ciency and worsen the outcome compared to anarchy (Skaperdas 2002) .
Several authors analyze technologies for overcoming appropriation con‡ict. Falkinger (2006) considers the non-cooperative investment in a pun-ishment mechanism that enforces contracts. Similarly, Sánchez-Pagés and Straub (2006) explain the endogenous emergence of norm enforcement institutions by agents'voluntary costly contributions to their formation. An enforcement technology is given, but players must still agree to adapt and use it. Once this decision is made and the enforcer of property rights is appointed, he uses this power benevolently and does not opportunistically abuse this power. The question whether and how individuals would like to resort to an enforcement technology-when it exists-is interesting. It does not address the problem of what restrains the agent who is empowered with this technology from abusing his power. Gradstein (2007) analyses the relationship between income distribution, democratic choice of property rights regimes and growth performance. A majority decision enforces the property rights regime in his framework. Unanimous or majoritarian adoption of institutions has strong intuitive appeal. However, we would like to go one step further and provide an explanation for collectively e¢ cient behavior which is self-enforcing in a fully non-cooperative equilibrium. We do not resort to an ultimate provider of enforcement nor to a formal enforcement technology or collective decision which provides this enforcement. Given the absence of a single player's enforcement power, no assumption is needed about what prevents the enforcer from abusing this power. Collectively e¢ cient and peaceful behavior within a group, organization or clan nevertheless can emerge. Con ‡ict itself becomes the key driver in this process as the absence of enforcement institutions leads to a multiplicity of equilibria, some of which involve costly con ‡ict and some of which do not. The norm allows the distribution of a "peace dividend" in an equilibrium without con ‡ict, which emerges from e¢ cient collective action and from abstention from …ghting. A "bad" equilibrium is selected if players do not behave according to the norms.
Our framework induces e¢ cient provision of a pure public good and points to an important motivation for voluntary contributions. Research on the private provision of public goods identi…ed four possible motivations for making own contributions. A contributor may bene…t from an increase in the amount of the public good that is provided. 6 Also, a contributor may like the feeling of doing something good; Andreoni (1990) referred to this motivation as the warm glow of giving. Further, contributions to the public good may be instrumental for reaching other goals. Bagwell and Bernheim (1996) and Glazer and Konrad (1996) suggested that observably contributing to a public good may convey information to others and this may generate other bene…ts. Finally, Bénabou and Tirole (2006) introduced the role of self-image as a possible motivation for charitable giving. In our framework another motivation dominates these motives for giving: if individual contributions do conform with social norms, the non-cooperative outcome is peaceful. Otherwise societal con ‡ict is induced and makes all players worse o¤. Hence individual contributions to group e¤ort occur "in the shadow of con ‡ict" (Hirshleifer 1994 ). Hirshleifer advances the much more general and provocative proposition that "cooperation, with a few obvious exceptions, occurs only in the shadow of con ‡ict".
From a structural point of view, our analysis is related to research on the relationship between inter-group con ‡ict and rules that govern the behavior of members of the same group vis-a-vis each other. Nitzan (1991) and Davis and Reilly (1999) consider the implications of di¤erent rules governing a peaceful distribution of resources inside the group for the willingness of group members to make voluntary contributions to group e¤ort. These rules and the peaceful distribution inside the group are taken as given in these frameworks. Their work shows that merit rules, if they can be enforced, can be an important incentive instrument for groups for overcoming free-rider incentives. Katz and Tokatlidu (1996) , Wärneryd (1998) and Müller and Wärneryd (2001) highlight that peaceful allocation rules inside the group cannot be taken for granted. A peaceful merit rule may be a desirable incentive system from the group's perspective, but in many contexts such rules cannot be enforced. In this case hierarchies of con ‡ict may emerge, with a con ‡ict between groups being followed by a con ‡ict among the members of the victorious group for the prize. 7 We as well consider an inter-group contest with possible free-riding of group members, that is followed by a strong intra-group contest about the allocation of the winner prize. However, we show that these two activities may "incentivize" players mutually; e¢ cient contributions to group e¤ort and peaceful settlement of internal con ‡ict may then be complementary equilibrium outcomes.
In political science there has been careful discussion about whether, and how, violent con ‡ict can or cannot be avoided in the context of the theory of rational approaches to studying war. From this literature it turns out (see, e.g., Fearon 1995) that asymmetric information and commitment problems are the keys to explaining why con ‡ict may take place, despite its obvious ine¢ ciency compared to a peaceful settlement. However, Slantchev (2003) explains how the occurrence of multiple equilibria and di¤erences in the desirability of reaching a particular equilibrium, together with expectations about which action triggers which equilibrium may lead to actual con ‡ict. Conceptually, Slantchev's analysis is close to ours. Slantchev uses the framework of multiple equilibria to explain why wasteful con ‡ict may emerge in a complete information world with non-cooperative bargaining. We use it to explain how (by using the con ‡ict equilibria as credible threats) e¢ cient cooperation and distributional harmony inside a group a group may emerge.
The analytic framework
Our formal analysis is framed in the context of primitive states, with contributions to military e¤ort as the contributions to the group's collective good. We consider a clan that consists of a set N of n members. They interact with an outside enemy in an external con ‡ict, and they interact inside.
We …rst study interaction inside. The members need to solve the problem of how to share the clan's income between them. One may think of the prize as an amount of a homogenous and universal good, or simply an amount of money, whose size we normalize to V = 1. The clan members may …ght about this amount or settle. However, as all clan members are endowed with the means to …ght about resources, any contractual relationships or simple bargaining concepts that also require commitment to some bargaining rules 8 are ruled out as a settlement outcome. The outcome is determined in a fully non-cooperative framework in which players can, and may, use e¤ort in trying to appropriate the prize for themselves in a contest where the amount of appropriation e¤ort chosen by the players determines the allocation of the 8 If violent means for appropriation are available, even 'non-cooperative' bargaining requires commitment: the acceptance of certain rules, the commitment abstain from using other, more violent, means of appropriation during the negotiations, or ex post, once a mutually agreed deal is struck and the surplus is divided. Why rational agents use violence in a con ‡ict instead of negotiating peacefully has been analysed most carefully in international politics (see Fearon (1995) for an overview.) Slantchev (2003) highlights the views of Clausewitz and of Schelling on war. They consider war itself as a bargaining process.
prize.
The internal governance structure is anticipated when the clan has the opportunity to acquire, or faces the threat of losing, some amount of income in a contest with an external enemy. In this external con ‡ict the clan members must decide about their contribution to the total military e¤ort. We turn to this external con ‡ict having solved the internal allocation problem to which we turn now.
Inside the clan
Consider a clan that has n members who constitute the set N . This clan owns some income V = 1, for instance, as a result of winning an external con ‡ict with an enemy. The allocation of this prize among its members is governed by an appropriation game in which contest e¤orts decide about the allocation of the prize, and in which the timing of the choices of contest e¤orts is endogenous. Prior to this appropriation game, in a …rst stage, G1, one designated player 1 is allowed to distribute non-negative payments (a 2 ; a 3 ; :::a n ) to the other group members. We denote a (a 2 ; a 3 ; :::a n ) and a n X j=2 a j .
(
This player owns su¢ cient resources to make these payments, where a j 2 [0; V ] can be assumed without restricting generality. We call player 1 the clan leader. This player is the 'big-man' in our motivating examples in section 1. Payments take place at stage G1, and are fully unconditional: members who receive a payment do not, and cannot, promise anything in exchange for the payment, and simply follow their own narrow interests in subsequent decision making. These payments also do not alter the set of possible actions to be taken by any clan member in the future. For simplicity, we assume that these payments are public information; all payments are observed by all members. 9 Note, however, that payments can change the behavior of a player who is indi¤erent about his own future actions, or change players' expectations if there are multiple equilibria in the continuation game. The payments may therefore drive the selection between a peaceful equilibrium and violent …ghts inside the clan.
Stages G2-G4 describe the allocation of the prize in an all-pay auction with endogenous timing, building on Baik and Shogren (1992), Baik (1994 Baik ( , 2005 and Leininger (1993) . The cornerstone of this allocation rule is a contest success function that maps clan members' e¤ort choices into win probabilities. Let clan member i choose e¤ort x i . The probability p i that i wins the con ‡ict is a function of all contestants'e¤orts,
Denote
, then p i = 1 and p j = 0 for all j 6 = i. If there are several players who have chosen the same, highest e¤ort, x, we assume a tie-breaking rule that is outlined later and avoids discontinuity problems. 10 The three stages of this appropriation con ‡ict game are as follows.
First, in stage G2, each member decides about the timing of his own choice of contest e¤ort. There are two di¤erent points in time, early (e) and late (l). Each clan member must decide whether to make his e¤ort choice at one of these points of time. If he chooses e, he cannot reduce or increase his e¤ort choice at a later point in time l. Hence, clan members who choose e give members who choose l the opportunity to react to their e¤ort choices. Members who choose e are Stackelberg leaders with respect to all who choose l.
In stage G3, the point in time e is reached. At this point all observe their own and others'choices of timing. 12 Anyone who decided to make his e¤ort choice at e chooses his x i simultaneously with all others who made this same timing decision. E¤ort cost is quadratic in e¤ort, and we denote i's cost as
Clan members can, but need not, be symmetric. Generally we will assume that they may di¤er with respect to their cost of generating contest e¤ort, and consider them sorted and numbered such that c 1 c 2 ::: c n . Note that this together with the description of stage G1 implies that the leader has the lowest cost of contest e¤ort. 13 In stage G4, the point of time l is reached. All observe the e¤ort choices made by clan members who made this choice at time e. All others now decide simultaneously about their own e¤orts. The cost of a given amount of e¤ort is the same whether chosen at e or at l and is described by the quadratic cost function (3) . Recall that members who chose time e cannot revise their e¤ort choices at time l. Once all e¤ort choices are made, the prize is allocated according to the contest success function (2) .
For situations in which several clan members expend the same e¤ort we adopt the tie-breaking rules in Konrad und Leininger (2007) that are also discussed there and which are made in order to avoid equilibrium outcomes in which some player would like to expend the smallest possible positive amount of e¤ort: Let M be the set of players who choose x. Let E be the set of clan members who choose e, and L = N E the set of clan members who choose L. If M E, or M L, then each i 2 M wins the prize with the same probability equal to 1=#M , where #M is the cardinality of M . This is the standard tie-breaking rule for the simultaneous all-pay auction. If M \ E 6 = ? and M \ L 6 = ? then the allocation of the prize among the seen as a player's choice to delay unavoidable activities to the late period, preventing him from using this time in the late period for contest e¤ort. 12 Note that this assumption is not needed. For the results in Proposition 1 to hold it is necessary only that the choice of e or l becomes common knowledge among all clan members prior to l, which is consistent with the idea that a choice of e essentially means that a player delays mandatory duties to the future, and hence, commits to not using this future time for producing contest e¤ort. 13 Our results can be generalized to other cost functions than (3), but we constrain the analysis to this parametric case because it yields simple closed form solutions and allows for a simple ordering in terms of group members'e¤ort costs. players in M depends on their cost of e¤ort. If
+ ( x) and p i = 0 for all other players. The following lemma describes the equilibrium of the subgame starting in stage G3.
Lemma 1 The subgame starting at stage G3 has unique equilibrium payo¤s for any given choices t j 2 fe; lg. Payo¤s are characterized as follows: j = a j for all j = 2; :::n, and (4)
1 P n j=2 a j if t 1 = l and t j = e for all j = 2; :::n 1 c 1 c j min P n j=2 a j if t 1 = l and if t j = l for some j = 2; :::n with c j min minfc j jt j = l; j 6 = 1g 1
The result is proven in Konrad and Leininger (2007) , who combine and extend results of Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1996) and Kaplan, Luski and Wettstein (2003) . Intuitively, if t 1 = l and t j = e for all j = 2; :::n, then it makes no sense for j to expend positive e¤ort, as any e¤ort that costs j less than the value of the prize will be overbid by player 1 in the last round. Player 1 wins without any signi…cant e¤ort and his payo¤ equals the value of the prize, minus his unconditional payments from stage G1. Moreover, players 2; :::n receive nothing but the unconditional payment a j . This explains the …rst line in (5). A similar argument applies whenever player 1 chooses t 1 = l. All players who choose t j = e will not spend positive e¤ort, because they cannot win a positive payo¤ by any positive e¤ort choice. However, player 1 will be in a contest with other players who also chose t j = l. Given x j = 0 by all players who choose t j = e, the contest essentially reduces to a simultaneous contest among the group of players k who chose t k = l. The equilibrium outcome of this simultaneous contest is well known. Only the two players with the lowest cost parameter bid positive e¤ort, which is player 1 and player j min . The equilibrium is in mixed strategies, and some of the prize will be dissipated. For quadratic cost, 
).
If, instead, j = 2 chooses t j = e, then things are more complicated and the equilibrium strategies take into account that players with t k = l may overbid low e¤ort levels, but the same intuition gets through: j = 2 is the main competitor for player 1 and induces a dissipation equal to ) by a choice x 1 = 1= p c 2 , as no other player will ever reasonably choose a higher e¤ort. This limits his payo¤ from below, and, with some formal e¤ort, one can also show that this also limits his e¤ort from above (see Konrad and Leininger (2007) ). The bidding of players at the second stage l can be interpreted as an all-pay auction with a minimal bid requirement (namely, submit at least a bid as high as the highest bid from stage e). Perhaps surprisingly, bidding in the …rst stage l also reduces to an all-pay auction with a minimal bid requirement (namely, submit at least a bid as high as the highest individually rational bid of the player with the least cost, who moves at l).
Note that all players j = 2; :::n are fully indi¤erent with respect to their choice of timing. Their overall payo¤ is equal to the unconditional payment a j , and their payo¤ from participating in the contest is zero in expectation and independent of their timing. Their choices matter for player 1's payo¤, and if he could in ‡uence their behavior, he would have a strictly positive willingness to pay for making them choose t j = e. Of course, any such contractual relationship between the group members has been ruled out, as we study strictly non-cooperative outcomes in an environment without any contracts that require commitment, and without tacit collusion through repeated interaction.
Consider now stage G2. Lemma 2 For player 1 the choice of t 1 = l is a weakly dominant decision in the following sense: i) For any timing decisions t 1 = (t 2 ; :::; t n ) by players 2 to n there is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the full game with t = (l; t 2 ; :::; t n )
ii) For any t 1 = (e; t 3 ; :::; t n ) the decision t 1 = l is the unique equilibrium choice of player 1.
The proof of Lemma 2 follows from Proposition 2 in Konrad and Leininger (2007).
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 together suggest that the continuation game consisting of stages G2-G4 has at least 2 n 1 equilibria. In each of these equilibria player 1 chooses t 1 = l, but this choice can go along with any combination (t 2 ; :::; t n ) by the other players. The payo¤ for player j; with j 2 f2; :::; ng, is a j for all equilibria. The payo¤ for player 1 is highest and equal to 1 P n j=2 a j , if (t 2 ; :::; t n ) = (e; :::; e), and lowest and equal to 1 c 1 c 2 P n j=2 a j , if (t 2 ; :::; t n ) = (l; t 3 ; :::; t n ). Note, that player 1 is indi¤erent between t 1 = e and t 1 = l if t 2 = l; hence there are also equilibria in which player 1 chooses e, but these do not lead to new equilibrium payo¤ vectors.
In contrast, each of the players j = 2; :::n is fully indi¤erent with respect to his own choice of timing and the choice of timing by all other players. The choice of timing t j can therefore depend on any event or action that is observable at the beginning of G2; for instance on the payments made to group members. We denote this relationship as t j = j (a 2 ; a 3 ; :::a n ).
Here, j can be a trivial or non-trivial function of these payments. The particular function j determines which of the continuation equilibria in G2 G4 is chosen.
Proposition 1 De…ne A f (a 2 ; :::a n )ja < Groups may overcome the problem of wasteful internal …ghts about the distribution of the group income between its members in a fully non-cooperative game without repeated interaction, without reputation building, and without relying on the rules of a non-cooperative bargaining game. This peaceful equilibrium is compatible with a large number of distributions of the group income. The leader receives at least what he could obtain from …ghting, and any division of the 'peace dividend' c 1 c 2 is compatible with Proposition 1. 14 The discussion of the clan members'e¤orts to make the clan receive the rent in the external con ‡ict that is allocated among the clan members subsequently, will yield some further constraints on the feasible allocation of the clan's income. These constraints will result from a strictly non-cooperative analysis, but will still resemble some regime in which clan members receive transfers that are related to their 'merit'.
Note that Proposition 1 implicitly assumed that the leadership role was assigned to the player who is the strongest …ghter, as c 1 = min j2N fc j g. A player j with c j > c 1 cannot perform the leadership role. If he were to make positive transfers a > 0, he could never retrieve them. His payo¤ from the intra-group contest in any equilibrium would be 0. Hence any sort of leadership contest would see player 1 prevail. The sequencing of timing decisions has two e¤ects: it not only yields equilibria in pure strategies, but also an "e¢ ciency gain" if players move in an appropriate order. The latter e¤ect relies on the possibility that the strongest player can use his greater strength against weaker players through their expectations (i.e. without having to exert it) if he moves late (and the others early). If he moves early (or others join him in moving late), he actually has to exert his greater strength by making the largest e¤ort bid. This seriously limits the leadership potential of any player other than the strongest.
Note also that the leader behaves similarly to a 'big-man', making donations to the other group members. In order to make such donations, he needs access to funds which can be used for making the required distributions a . This fund can be external, private wealth, wealth that belongs to the clan, but is controlled independently by the clan leader, much like in the examples in section 1.
Collective action
The formation of clans, groups or states has a purpose -the provision of collective goods. One of the quintessential public goods problems in the con-text of primitive states is the collective provision of e¤ort to defend the clan's territory, or to expand this territory at the expense of rivals or enemies. 15 Returns to scale, or the importance of country size for relative strength in international con ‡ict, has been one of the key drivers of a process of consolidation and the formation of ever larger units. Riker (1966, pp . 2-3, 8-9 ) emphasizes military considerations as central for the formation of federations, and illustrates this using examples starting from the federation of city states in Ancient Greece. The theory of the optimal size of nations by Spolaore and Alesina (2002) attributes the recent breakup of larger nation states to the decline in the importance of international military con ‡ict in most modern, post cold-war times.
In an environment with con ‡ict between nations, larger units acquire smaller units and grow in strength, and there seems to be a natural tendency for a monopoly of force, unless there are counteracting forces, for instance the problem of internal cohesion and problems of internal coordination and communication. We will …rst consider the potential for collective action for a clan of given size. The optimal size of clans is discussed in a later section.
The ' external' con ‡ict Consider the competition between the clan and an enemy for a prize that can again be seen as an amount of resources, e.g., money or some homogenous universal good that is valued at V = 1. The contest follows the rules of an all-pay auction similar to the rules of the possible intra-clan con ‡ict. Let y E be the total contest e¤ort chosen by the enemy, and the enemy's cost of providing this e¤ort
Further, let each clan member decide on his own contribution y j to the clan's e¤ort, which causes a cost of e¤ort to this member that is equal to
The use of the same c j in (3) and (8) is mainly for notational parsimony. Clan members may di¤er in their relative abilities for internal and external …ghts, but often these abilities should be expected to be positively correlated.
In particular, it is not required for our results that the clan leader is a player with a superior …ghting ability in the external con ‡ict. Let the external con ‡ict e¤orts sum up to the total e¤ort:
This is a special case of more general technology determining the public good as a function of individual contributions, y C = y C (y 1 ; :::y n ). However, free riding incentives are particularly strong in this the case of perfect substitutability as in (9), this case dominates in the literature on private provision of public goods 16 , and our mechanism for implementing e¢ cient contributions can easily be adapted to a whole class of other functions. 17 The contest between the clan and the enemy is again governed by the same type of contest success function: the clan or the enemy wins the prize, depending on who expends higher e¤ort. A fair coin decides who wins the prize if y C = y E .
From the perspective of member i, any contribution y i to the aggregate level of y C is a contribution to a clan-wide pure public good. We …rst determine what the combinations of e¤ort (y 1 ; :::y n ) are that are collectively optimal from the perspective of the clan. Then we show that this collectively optimal behavior can be implemented as a fully non-cooperative equilibrium, taking into consideration that the prize must be allocated among the clan members if the clan wins the prize, and that this involves some intra-clan con ‡ict as studied in the previous section.
Optimal collective e¤ort in the inter-group con ‡ict Suppose that the clan manages to coordinate on a peaceful equilibrium once it wins the prize. In this case, the clan collectively values the prize by its nominal 16 McGuire (1974) introduced this setup when studying collective action. The seminal paper using this technology is Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986). For the case with contribution substitutability but convex individual contribution cost see Esteban and Ray (2001) . For further discussion and a survey see Batina and Ihori (2005) . 17 Other technologies are Hirshleifer's (1983) "weakest link" model with y C = min(y 1 ; :::; y n ), or the "best shot" model with y C = max(y 1 ; :::; y n ), or the case of a discontinuous public good such that the public good is provided if and only if the sum of contributions exceeds a given threshold as in Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) . In some of these cases an e¢ cient non-cooperative outcome exists already if there is no threat of an intra-group con ‡ict. value, which we normalized to V = 1. The optimal choice of the clan's e¤ort y C will generally depend on the enemy's choice of e¤ort. However, the following proposition determines how a given amount of aggregate e¤ort can be generated in an e¤ort cost minimizing way.
Proposition 2 If the clan generates a given amount of aggregate e¤ort y in a cost minimizing way, the clan's aggregate e¤ort cost is equal to
Proof. The cost function D C (y) of the clan is obtained as the solution to the maximization problem y C = y 1 + y 2 + :::y n ! max subject to P n j=1 c j y
Accordingly,
, and
. This, in turn, implies
Integrating and taking into consideration that D C (0) = 0 yields (10) .
Note that c as de…ned in (10) decreases if the clan grows by an additional member. This monotonicity holds whatever the current size of the clan and the combination of cost parameters is. The size and the distribution of cost determines the size of the change in c. Large clans have a lower cost of a given amount of e¤ort in an external con ‡ict if this amount of e¤ort is e¢ ciently provided: if there are more clan members, each member needs to contribute a smaller portion of the given clan e¤ort, and, with increasing marginal cost, the aggregate cost is decreasing in the number of clan members.
Also note that the cost parameter c of the clan cost function D C (y) equals This is a technological source of feasible "e¢ ciency gains"for the clan beyond the leader's strength. These gains increase in n and the strength of any new member of the clan. The fact that e¢ cient 'cost sharing'among clan members with quadratic individual cost functions in the provision of clan e¤ort leads to the "per capita harmonic mean" of these cost functions as the clan cost function is of independent interest. Propostion 2 means that clan member j has to contribute e¤ort y j (y) = c c j y at individual cost c 2 c j y in the e¢ cient provision of clan e¤ort y. I.e. all members have to contribute and stronger members have to contribute more than weaker members.
The lower cost translates into an advantage in the external con ‡ict with an enemy if the clan can manage to mobilize each member to contribute the e¢ cient amount of e¤ort. Let the clan maximize
and, similarly, the enemy maximize,
Then the following holds:
Proposition 3 Consider the all-pay auction between the clan and an enemy for a prize which they both value at 1. If the clan can choose its aggregate e¤ort e¢ ciently in order to maximize (12) , this payo¤ is
A proof relies on the standard result of an all-pay auction between two contestants with the same valuations of winning and quadratic cost functions (7) and (10) .
The proposition shows that the clan can win a positive payo¤ in the wasteful con ‡ict with the enemy if
This condition de…nes the potential superiority of the clan in the con ‡ict with the enemy. As c depends on the number and cost distribution of clan members, this superiority is endogenous with respect to the composition of the clan.
Equilibrium collective action Can the clan members non-cooperatively coordinate on the e¢ cient collective action? What are the conditions that must hold for such a coordination to be feasible or likely? How does this ability or possibility depend on the size of the clan, on the internal structure of the clan, the distribution of cost and on the clan's ability to distribute any clan income peacefully among its members? These are the questions we turn to now. The external con ‡ict takes place in a stage W(ar). As discussed above, if the clan and its enemy choose their e¤orts y C and y E in order to maximize their respective payo¤s, the equilibrium is in mixed strategies in which the e¤ort choices are drawn from random variables with cumulative density functions F C and F E , respectively. E¢ cient provision of a given e¤ort level y C by the clan requires a particular, unique allocation of e¤orts, (y 1 ; :::; y n ), among its members. If y C is a draw from a random distribution, it is therefore important for e¢ ciency that the individual e¤ort choices and the choice of y C are perfectly correlated. In order to make this feasible, we allow for the following coordination device. Some number is chosen as the outcome of a random draw from a distribution with cumulative density
This is observed by all clan members (but not by the enemy) before they freely and simultaneously make their individual e¤ort choices y j . Once all clan members and the enemy have chosen their e¤orts, and all e¤ort choices are observed by all players. The clan wins the prize if y C > y E , and the enemy wins if y C < y E . Each of them wins with probability 1/2 if y C = y E . If the enemy wins, the game is over, as the clan does not receive a rent to …ght about internally . If the clan wins, then the clan members enter into stages G1-G4 as discussed in the section on internal con ‡ict.
Proposition 4 Let the clan be potentially superior to the enemy in the sense of (14) . If c 1 c 2 is su¢ ciently close to zero, then a subgame perfect equilibrium exists in which the clan can implement the externally e¢ cient e¤orts and a peaceful distribution of rents from war.
Proof. Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 characterize the equilibria of the subgames consisting of stages G2-G4. Each clan member except the leader is indi¤erent whether to choose t j = e or t j = l. The choices and the equilibrium of G2-G4 can therefore depend on the history of the game at the beginning of G2. At G2, a history consists of a , choices of e¤orts in the inter-group con ‡ict by the clan members, (y 1 ; :::y n ), an e¤ort choice by the enemy, y E , an outcome of the contest in which the clan wins the prize, and a vector of unconditional transfers (a 2 ; :::; a n ) that was chosen and paid by the leader in stage G1. Hence, t i = i ( ; y 1 ; :::y n ; y E ; a 2 ; :::a n )
replaces (6) . Consider the following candidate choice of timing in the continuation equilibrium at G2 as a function of the history up to this point, (l; l; l; :::; l) for any other history that reaches G2, (16) and the equilibrium payo¤s determined by these choices as characterized in Proposition 1. To con…rm that (16) can induce an e¢ cient subgame-perfect equilibrium of the overall game, consider …rst G1 which is reached if the clan was victorious in the external con ‡ict.
If at least one clan member deviated from y j ( ), then t = (l; l; :::l), independent of a. Accordingly, the leader chooses a = (0; 0; :::; 0) in this case, and the equilibrium payo¤s are If all clan members have chosen y j ( ), the leader's choice of a determines the equilibrium outcome of the subgame in stages G2-G4. For a 6 = a , the payo¤s are
2 for j = 2; :::n, and, among these transfer payments, the clan leader's payo¤ is maximal for a = (0; 0; :::; 0). Alternatively, the leader can choose a = a . This yields payo¤s 1 a c 1 (y 1 ( )) 2 for j = 1 and a j c j (y j ( )) 2 for j = 2; :::n.
The leader chooses a if c 1 c 2 a 0.
Turn now to the stage W. The mixed strategy described by the cumulative density function
is the enemy's optimal reply to F C (y) = F ( ) as any y E 2 [0;
) yields the enemy an expected payo¤ of zero and higher e¤ort y E yields negative expected payo¤.
Taking F E and the equilibrium e¤ort choices y k ( ) of all other clan members k 6 = j as given, j 6 = 1 chooses between y j ( ) which yields payo¤
and arg max y j 6 =y j ( ) f c j (y j ) 2 g = 0. The latter makes use of a j = 0 if y j ( ) 6 = y j ( ), and of j's payo¤ from the actual intra-clan con ‡ict being zero for j 6 = 1. The two possible candidates for an optimum are y j = 0 or y j = y j ( ). y j ( )
. This is ful…lled for all 2 (0;
Taking F E and the equilibrium e¤ort choices y j ( ) of all j 6 = 1 as given, j = 1 chooses between y 1 ( ), by which he attains a payo¤
which is his payo¤ in the e¢ cient equilibrium in the intra-clan contest which results from a choice of a , and the payo¤ from y 1 6 = y 1 ( ) that maximizes
The characterization of the payo¤ (20) uses the fact the deviation from y 1 ( ) will induce a = 0 and the equilibrium with violent intra-clan con ‡ict. The choice problem of the leader therefore reduces to the choice between y 1 ( ) = "stand alone" strategy in which he cheats on e¤ort in the external con ‡ict, and then also does not make positive transfers, are minimal, because his payo¤ in the resulting …ghting equilibrium is zero. The opposite benchmark case is obtained if c 1 << c 2 , and c c E . In this case the leader does not gain much from coordinated action, as the overall prize the clan wins from coordinated action is negligible. It turns out that the e¢ cient coordinated equilibrium cannot be supported for all cost parameter values. This is shown for a numerical example in the Appendix.
Proposition 4 characterizes rules for contributions to the collective action and transfers from the leader to the followers that serve as a norm. If all players obey the norm, the outcome is e¢ cient from the perspective of the group. Moreover, all players have an incentive to obey the norm. The norm is also self-enforcing. If the norm is not obeyed by some player, this simply leads to a di¤erent subgame perfect equilibrium which is inferior to the equilibrium in the subgame chosen if the norm is obeyed.
Many other norms can also be sustained as an equilibrium by the fact that the players can reach the peaceful equilibrium only if they obey the norm. These norms may support an equilibrium in which the behavior of the clan members is suboptimal from the clan perspective. An example would be to replace y j ( ) = c c j by some y j = c c j + for su¢ ciently small . This choice makes the clan win the contest with probability 1 (and leads to a di¤erent optimal reply by the enemy). It also causes some excessive e¤ort cost. But, if is small, and if this behavior is a necessary condition for coordinating on the peaceful equilibrium, this ine¢ cient norm can be sustained. This reproduces an important property of norms. Norms are excessively stable in the sense that they may become obsolete or inferior to some alternative norm but may still continue to be obeyed.
We turn to the comparative static properties of the result in Proposition 4 now.
First, the clan cannot do better using a commitment on even higher e¤ort. F C ( ) is the optimal reply to F E of a player who values winning the prize by V = 1 and has a cost parameter c < c E . 18 Second, there are further equilibria. Note, however, that this is not our key question. The key question was whether what is e¢ cient for the clan can be implemented as the outcome of fully non-cooperative interaction.
Third, the distribution of cost functions inside the clan is important, but the number of clan members also matters. Consider, for instance, a given c E and a set of players who all have the same cost parameter c 0 >> c E . As
a su¢ ciently large clan exists such that c E > c, making the payo¤ of the clan in the peaceful non-cooperative equilibrium that is characterized in Proposition 4 strictly positive.
Optimal clan size
Would clan members prefer an ever larger clan, or is there an optimal n for given c E ? An answer to this question depends on the cost structure of clans, and also on the norm about the equilibrium transfer payments a . We focus on the particular case in which the cost parameter is the same for all clan members, i.e., c j = c 0 for all j = 1; 2; :::n. If all clan members have the same parameter c j in their cost of …ghting e¤ort, this constitutes the strongest clan with n members that a leader with individual cost parameter c 1 = c 0 can assemble. Its clan cost function is characterized by a cost parameter c = c 0 n . Any clan with the same number of members, but with c j < c 0 for some clan members, has a higher cost of …ghting. Moreover, for c j = c 0 for all j, internal distributional …ghting is easiest to contain, because the sacri…ce from actual internal …ghting is largest.
Egalitarian clans With identical cost structures for all members, each member contributes the same amount of e¤ort to the external con ‡ict. If the distribution is egalitarian, each member receives the same share in the payo¤. We call this case egalitarian. Let c j = c 0 = const: for all j = 1; 2; :::n, and assume that the incentive compatibility constraints (18) , (19) and (22) are ful…lled for symmetric payments a j = 1 n . This is the case if the clan is potentially superior to the enemy: (18) holds trivially, and (19) and (22) coincide and reduce to potential superiority of the clan. The size that maximizes per capita payo¤ then solves
where, for homogenous clans, c = c 0 =n. The …rst-order condition can be solved for n and this yields
This result is stated as a proposition:
Proposition 5 Consider a homogenous and egalitarian clan. The number of clan members that maximizes the individual member's payo¤ in the e¢ cient equilibrium is described by (23) .
The condition (23) states that the size of n is chosen that reduces the cost parameter c to half the size of c E : c = c 0 n = c E 2 .
Conclusions
Experience from everyday life tells us that if individual members of a group do not do their "duty", this can easily upset the other members, and can upset the peaceful regime that may otherwise prevail inside the group. If the norms about social behavior within the group are violated by some group members not contributing what is considered their appropriate share of contributions to the common interest, this may induce other members of the group to reconsider given predispositions of intra-group distribution of resources and may cause quarrelling among the group members. Such quarrelling dissipates resources and is collectively disadvantageous. In turn, anticipation of quarrelling as an outcome of neglecting own duties may give the group members an incentive to behave. Hence, the fear of possible …ghting and resource wasting con ‡ict inside the group may stabilize an e¢ cient outcome in which group members voluntarily contribute to group speci…c public goods. In this paper we provide a microeconomic underpinning for this everyday life experience within the strictly non-cooperative framework of a game with a …nite horizon. Multiple equilibria can exist with respect to the distribution of resources within the group, some of which are peaceful and some of which are characterized by resource wasting con ‡ict. If the selection of equilibrium is driven by the group members'conduct with respect to their contributions to a group speci…c public good, this can induce fully e¢ cient voluntary contributions to the public good. This is a key result of the paper.
The general mechanism analyzed here works equally well for contributions to many group speci…c public goods. More speci…cally, we considered contributions to protecting the group against other rival groups, or contributions of e¤ort in a resource wasting con ‡ict between this and another group. It turned out that there is a natural role for one group member to perform the role as leader. The leader has no enforcement power. On the contrary, he is expected to make gifts to the group members and the only source of enforcement is equilibrium selection that is governed by social norms. The leader makes gifts once the other group members contributed their e¢ cient share to group output. For an outside observer, these contributions and gifts seemingly look like reciprocity. However, they are not the outcome of preferences for reciprocity or altruism. They emerge from narrowly sel…sh preferences in non-cooperative equilibrium.
The leadership regime that emerges as an equilibrium outcome is in line with observed leadership structures in some primitive states, gangs, and other organizations that cannot rely on courts and other external enforcement mechanisms, either because they operate outside the formal sector, or because contributions to collective output and internal …ghting e¤ort are non-veri…able, making a contractual arrangement very di¢ cult.
We identify a reason why the role as leader should be performed by the strongest group member. We also …nd that groups are stronger if they are homogenous, and we …nd that a limited group size is optimal.
One main di¤erence between our framework and many other considerations and possible solutions that are o¤ered for overcoming the collective action problem is the strictly non-cooperative nature of our framework. We also do not rely on the folk theorem of in…nitely repeated games. We also do not assume that the group collectively manages to empower a government that punishes group members who do not contribute their share. Instead, we consider a framework for which each and every decision is made independently, and in which any sequence of individual actions is sequentially rational. Punishment for norm disobedience is self-enforcing as disobedience triggers the selection of an equilibrium in the continuation game which involves lower payo¤s, whereas obedience triggers the selection of a superior non-cooperative equilibrium.
Appendix
We show that the e¢ cient equilibrium need not be achievable for some cost parameters. Assume that c E = 1 + and consider the limiting case with ! 0. Assume further that N = f1; 2; 3g, with c 1 = 2, c 2 = c 3 = 4. Note that c = 1. Note further that the maximum e¤ort by the enemy is y Emax = 1, as D E (1) = 1 = V . If the members of N play e¢ ciently, the maximum = 1 is generated by e¤ort levels y 1 = . Hence, the minimum that needs to be paid to 2 and 3 is a 2 = a 3 = c 2 (y 2 (1)) 2 = 4 = 0. Now consider a leader who defaults, given = 1, and chooses y 1 = 0. In this case, N wins with a probability F E (1=2) = c( 
)
2 = 1=4, and, once the clan wins the prize, the leader receives an expected contest payo¤ in the intra-clan contest that equals (1 c 1 c 2 ) = 1=2. Hence, the payo¤ is zero if the leader behaves according to the equilibrium candidate of Proposition 4, but receives 1=8 if he defaults. This counter example shows that the e¢ cient equilibrium cannot always be implemented.
